A Puzzle about Unidentifiability

I am unsatisfied with some of the basic terminology that we use in UAP studies, and I don’t know what to do (although I have some ideas, which I’ll save for the sequel). In particular, deep down inside, I find the concept of unidentifiability that is at the core of the subject to be puzzling — and hopefully not paradoxical. I do not think that I am alone. In his Unconventional Flying Objects, in a subsection titled “What’s a Good Name?”, Paul Hill bemoans the involvement of this concept at the core of the subject:

“…I thought I should point out that UFO is not a reasonable name or acronym, and explain what I mean when I use it. […] One to two hundred years ago, science was called natural philosophy, and scientists were known as natural philosophers, or naturalists. When a field naturalist made a discovery, he first identified the find as something new or a variant of organized knowledge. He then classified it, and gave it a descriptive name. Now when we discover an unconventional object, we identify it as “unidentified” and name it the same! On the first page of The Report on Unidentified Flying Objects, we find whom to thank for this contradiction. Major Edward Ruppelt says, ‘UFO is the official term that I created to replace the words flying saucers.’ [...] It is assumed that anyone with a good dictionary can see why unidentified is a misnomer.” [Hill, Unconventional Flying Objects, p. 26 (emphasis my own)]

It is easy simply to ignore the point that Hill makes in this passage. But I believe that he uncovers an interesting puzzle about the notion of unidentifiability. It is this: there appears to be something self-defeating about asserting of any particular object that it is unidentified or unidentifiable (see the emphasized sentence above). I also believe that this puzzle has an analogue in the philosophy of language, regarding so-called negative existentials. In his classic paper on negative existentials, Richard Cartwright outlines the puzzle. I’ll quote him at length:

“Since ancient times negative existentials have been a source of puzzlement. Although it is plain that among them some are true and some are false, it has sometimes appeared on reflection that none can possibly be true. Several lines of argument have seemed to lead to this conclusion, and prominent among them is the following. To deny the existence of something — of unicorns, for example — we must indicate what it is the existence of which is denied; and this requires that unicorns be referred to, or mentioned: the negative existential must be about them. But things which do not exist cannot be referred to or mentioned; no statement can be about them. So, given that we have denied their existence, unicorns must after all exist. […] Presumably the argument tempts no one to renounce his cherished denials of existence. Nevertheless, as do other such puzzles, it focuses the attention on a question of fundamental importance to logical theory.” [Cartwright, “Negative Existentials” in his Philosophical Essays, p. 21 (emphasis my own)]

I emphasized a large part of the passage from Cartwright in order to show that, with minimal substitution of key phrases in the passage, a similar line of reasoning can be shown to apparently hold with respect to certain claims about UAP. Perhaps you can imagine an arch-pseudo-skeptic endorsing the following (I do not, however, assert that anyone has made this argument — but I would be thrilled to hear from anyone who has found this argument endorsed somewhere):

“To deny the identifiability of something — of UAP of alien origin, for example — we must indicate what it is the identifiability of which is denied; and this requires that some UAP of alien origin be identified: the unidentifiability claim must identify these UAP as being of alien origin. But things which are not identifiable cannot be identified. So, given that we have denied their identifiability, UAP of alien origin must after all be identified.” [Emphases meant to indicate instances of substitution.]

I purposefully used the example of UAP of alien origin, because this is often apparently what is at issue in debates over UAP between so-called skeptics and so-called believers. In my recent paper in Limina (“Expectations about Nonhuman Intelligence”), this is how I explicated one particular argument: it aims to show, roughly, that there are no UAP of alien origin. (It is important to note that in that paper, I use ‘alien’ as roughly synonymous with ‘nonhuman intelligence’. It is also perhaps important to note that I do not endorse the argument; indeed, quite the opposite.)

Just as the puzzle of negative existentials tempts no one to renounce his cherished denials of existence, I believe that this puzzle of unidentifiability should not necessarily tempt us to renounce our cherished claims regarding UAP. Rather, I think that it should focus our attention on the question of what it is for something to be identifiable, which should be of fundamental importance to UAP studies. As I conceive this project, it is different from arriving at a set of rules or criteria that you might follow in order to identify something. It is closer to trying to arrive at a theory of the meaning of ‘identifiable’, although it may not even be the same as that. We may similarly distinguish rules-of-thumb regarding what to do (“Do what your mother tells you!”) from a theory of right action (“Necessarily, an act is morally right just when it would promote the greatest utility.”). This distinction -- between a rule-of-thumb about right action and a theory of right action -- is a common distinction made in introduction to ethics courses, especially in discussion of the famous Euthyphro Dilemma. It is standard philosophical fare (whether or not you accept its legitimacy). I suggest that we may apply this distinction to the concept of identifiability.

I close for now with an observation, and some questions. The observation: Paul Hill reacts to his puzzle by eschewing the notion of unidentifiability in his usage of ‘UFO’: for him, the ‘U’ stands for ‘unconventional’ instead of ‘unidentified’ or ‘unidentifiable’. See Hill, Unconventional Flying Objects, p. 27: "Borrowing the adjective unconventional from Coral Lorenzen's usage, I use unconventional object until a more descriptive name appears or is accepted. Since UFO is shorter and so well known, this acronym is used with the understanding that the U stands for unconventional."

The questions: (1) Is Hill’s reaction to his puzzle justified? (2) Is Hill’s puzzle the same as the puzzle that I asserted above is an analogue of the negative existentials puzzle, or are they distinct? (3) Are they truly puzzles, or are they pseudo-puzzles: apparently puzzling merely because they are confused mishmashes of philosophical bibble-babble? (4) What might a proper theory of identifiability assert, and how might it “solve” the puzzle(s) mentioned above?

It is the final question that I am most interested in trying to answer, but I do believe that an answer to (4) should also make plain how we should answer (1)-(3).